How to encrypt docker images or source code in docker images?
Say if only some strings need to be encrypted. Could possibly encrypt this data using openssl or an alternative solution. Encryption solution should be setup inside the docker container. When building container - data is encrypted. When container is run - data is decrypted (possibly with the help of an entry using a passphrase passed from .env file). This way container can be stored safely.
I am going to play with it this week as time permits, as I am pretty curious myself.
Realistically no, if a user has permission to run the docker daemon then they are going to have access to all of the images - this is due to the elevated permissions docker requires in order to run.
See the extract from the docker security guide for more info on why this is.
Docker daemon attack surface
Running containers (and applications) with Docker implies running the Docker daemon. This daemon currently requires root privileges, and you should therefore be aware of some important details.
First of all, only trusted users should be allowed to control your Docker daemon. This is a direct consequence of some powerful Docker features. Specifically, Docker allows you to share a directory between the Docker host and a guest container; and it allows you to do so without limiting the access rights of the container. This means that you can start a container where the /host directory will be the / directory on your host; and the container will be able to alter your host filesystem without any restriction. This is similar to how virtualization systems allow filesystem resource sharing. Nothing prevents you from sharing your root filesystem (or even your root block device) with a virtual machine.
This has a strong security implication: for example, if you instrument Docker from a web server to provision containers through an API, you should be even more careful than usual with parameter checking, to make sure that a malicious user cannot pass crafted parameters causing Docker to create arbitrary containers.
For this reason, the REST API endpoint (used by the Docker CLI to communicate with the Docker daemon) changed in Docker 0.5.2, and now uses a UNIX socket instead of a TCP socket bound on 127.0.0.1 (the latter being prone to cross-site request forgery attacks if you happen to run Docker directly on your local machine, outside of a VM). You can then use traditional UNIX permission checks to limit access to the control socket.
You can also expose the REST API over HTTP if you explicitly decide to do so. However, if you do that, being aware of the above mentioned security implication, you should ensure that it will be reachable only from a trusted network or VPN; or protected with e.g., stunnel and client SSL certificates. You can also secure them with HTTPS and certificates.
The daemon is also potentially vulnerable to other inputs, such as image loading from either disk with ‘docker load’, or from the network with ‘docker pull’. This has been a focus of improvement in the community, especially for ‘pull’ security. While these overlap, it should be noted that ‘docker load’ is a mechanism for backup and restore and is not currently considered a secure mechanism for loading images. As of Docker 1.3.2, images are now extracted in a chrooted subprocess on Linux/Unix platforms, being the first-step in a wider effort toward privilege separation.
Eventually, it is expected that the Docker daemon will run restricted privileges, delegating operations well-audited sub-processes, each with its own (very limited) scope of Linux capabilities, virtual network setup, filesystem management, etc. That is, most likely, pieces of the Docker engine itself will run inside of containers.
Finally, if you run Docker on a server, it is recommended to run exclusively Docker in the server, and move all other services within containers controlled by Docker. Of course, it is fine to keep your favorite admin tools (probably at least an SSH server), as well as existing monitoring/supervision processes (e.g., NRPE, collectd, etc).